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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case no. 960767-CA 
vs. : Priority No. 3 
HENRY GALETKA, Warden, : 
Respondent, Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order signed and 
entered on October 25, 1996, by the Honorable Pat B. Brian, in an for the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The Findings and Conclusions were entered after a hearing 
before Judge Brian on Appellant's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. This court has appellate 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992), and Rule 26(2)(b), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVTCW 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law that Appellant had knowingly 
and voluntarily waived his statute of limitation defense to a crime that he pled guilty to as part of 
1 
a plea bargain agreement. The standard of review for a conclusion of law is one of correctness 
with no particular deference to the trial court. See Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990). This issue was preserved for appeal. See R. beginning at 224, and at 182 and 
183. 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law that Appellant was not denied 
effective assistance of counsel when Appellant's appointed counsel allowed Appellant to plead 
guilty to the charge of tampering with evidence, without advising him that he did not have to 
plead to such an offense because the statute of limitations had run. The standard of review as to 
conclusions of law is set forth inLaffiks as cited above. This issue was preserved for appeal. See 
R. beginning at 224, and at 182 and 183. 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law that Appellant was not 
inappropriately assessed $160,000.00 in restitution. The Standard of review as to conclusions of 
law is set forth in Landes as cited above. This issue was preserved for appeal. See, R. beginning 
at 226, and 184 at paragraph four (4). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in relevant part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . the assistance of 
counsel for his defense. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution reads in relevant part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
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person and by counsel.... 
Section 77-32a-l Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), reads: 
In a criminal action the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution and 
pay costs. 
Section 77-32a-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), reads in relevant part: 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state . . . in investigating, 
searching for, apprehending and prosecuting the defendant, including attorneys fees of 
counsel assigned to represent the defendant.... Costs cannot include expenses inherent in 
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection with the 
maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be made by the public 
irrespective of specific violations of law. Costs cannot include attorneys fees for 
prosecuting attorneys. 
Section 76-3-201 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), reads in relevant part as follows: 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim.... 
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
Section 76-1-302 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), reads in relevant part as follows: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony . . . shall be commenced within four years after it is committed; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was arrested on October 23, 1986, and charged with first degree murder. On 
May 1, 1989, Appellant was tried and convicted of first degree murder in the Third District Court 
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison. Appellant 
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subsequently made a motion for a new trial which was denied by the district court. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), reversed the district 
court's denial of Appellant's motion for a new trial and remanded the case for a new trial. Before 
a trial took place, Appellant, through his appointed counsel, entered into a plea bargain 
arrangement wherein Appellant would plead guilty to manslaughter, a second degree felony, and 
tampering with evidence, also a second degree felony. Appellant was subsequently sentenced on 
these charges. Appellant filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, and after a hearing on this 
Petition, Judge Brian dismissed the Petition with prejudice. Appellant has now appealed the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by Judge Brian as a result of the 
hearing. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Appellant was arrested on October 23, 1986, and charged with first degree murder. R. 
17. 
2. At a jury trial on this charge held before the Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third 
District Court, Appellant was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison. R. 18. 
3. Appellant subsequently made a motion for a new trial which was denied by Judge 
Brian. Appellant appealed this denial, and in the case of State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1991), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of Judge Brian, and remanded the case for 
a new trial. R. 18. 
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4. The new trial never took place. The prosecution and Appellant, through his appointed 
counsel, entered into negotiations, and a plea bargain was agreed to wherein the Information 
would be amended to manslaughter, a second degree felony, and another count of tampering with 
evidence, also a second degree felony. R. 18. 
5. Appellant pled guilty to these two charges and was sentenced on September 8, 1993. 
Appellant was sentenced to two consecutive 1 to 15 terms on the two second degree felonies, and 
he was ordered to pay a fine of $10,000.00 on each count, and he was ordered to "pay restitution 
in the amount of $160,000.00 to Cache County plus the expenses of burial of the victim paid to 
the natural mother." R. 6. 
6. When the plea bargain was being considered by Appellant, the original proposed second 
count was perjury. However, counsel for Appellant told him and the prosecutor that Appellant 
could not plead guilty to that charge because the statute of limitations had run. R. 224. 
7. The prosecution subsequently proposed that instead of perjury that Appellant plead to 
tampering with evidence along with the manslaughter charge. At no time did counsel for 
Appellant specifically tell him that the statute of limitations had also run on the tampering with 
evidence charge, and at no time during sentencing was the issue raised by the court. R. 224, 234, 
235. 
8. When Appellant pled guilty to the tampering with evidence charge in 1993, it had been 
about seven years since his arrest in 1986. 
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9. Appellant filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief with the Third District Court on May 
24, 1996. Among other things, Appellant requested the District Court to dismiss the tampering 
with Evidence conviction on the basis that it should have be barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations for felonies. Appellant also requested a finding that his appointed counsel was 
ineffective due to not advising Appellant of the statute of limitations issue with the tampering with 
evidence charge, and Appellant requested a finding vacating the order of $160,000.00 in 
restitution to Cache County on the basis that the order violated Utah Code Ann. Section 77-32a-2 
(1953 as amended). R. 17-39. 
10. A hearing was held before Judge Brian on Appellant's Petition on September 3, 1996. 
All three issues cited above were argued by Appellant at the hearing. In response to the 
arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel and the statute of limitations issue, Judge Brian 
stated: 
The Court is really not interested in that. Who knows what went on as the pea bargain was 
struck and the dialogue between counsel and the parties? And the record is barren that 
there was any misrepresentations or anything else in that regard. And the court believes 
that if, in fact, that occurred, then there should have been a timely request to withdraw the 
plea, based on incompetence of counsel or misrepresentation of counsel or something. But 
that occurred nearly four years ago, didn't it? R. 227. 
11. At the hearing, it was the position of Appellee that in regards to the statute of 
limitations issue, Appellant had basically waived the right to assert that bar when he pled guilty. 
Counsel for Appellee further stated that "the question is whether or not Utah, with regard to our 
statute of limitations, is a jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional case." R. 231, 232. 
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12. Counsel for Appellee went on to state that "I think that the Court in both the Parsons 
case as well as the Sery case has held basically, statute of limitations is a nonjurisdictional issue, 
which, of course, can be waived by virtue of the guilty plea." R. 232. 
13. Judge Brian indicated that he was persuaded by this rationale. R. 232. 
14. There was no response by counsel for Appellee in regards to the issue of restitution 
in the amount of $160,000.00. R. 214-244. 
15. At the conclusion of argument at the hearing, Judge Brian announced his findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and final order. Judge Brian did not make any finding as to the issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel or the issue of whether Appellant should pay the $160,000.00 
in restitution. R. 240-244. 
16. Counsel for Appellee prepared Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order 
which was signed by Judge Brian and entered in the record on October 25, 1996. R. 177. 
17. In the written Findings of Fact there were no findings in regards to the issue of 
whether Appellant should pay the $160,000.00 in restitution. R. 177-180. 
18. In the written Findings of Fact there were no findings as to the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. All that is stated is that: 
In addition to claims against the Board, Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because he allowed petitioner to plea to the tampering charge when the statute 
of limitations for that crime had allegedly run. R. 180. 
19. In the written Findings of Fact there were no findings in regards to the issue of 
whether the tampering charge should be dismissed because it was barred by the statute of 
limitations. All that was stated was that: 
Petitioner asserts that he should not be forced to serve the 1-15 year consecutive sentence 
for the tampering conviction because he could not have been tried on that offense had he 
not pled guilty. R. 180. 
20. In its Conclusions of Law the court held that Appellant had knowingly and voluntarily 
entered into the plea agreement and thereby waived any defenses he may have had including the 
statute of limitations. R. 182, 183. 
21. There was no specific conclusion of law regarding either the ineffective assistance of 
counsel issue or the restitution issue. R. 182, 183. 
22. In its Order the Court stated that: 
4. Petitioner's Post-conviction claims are deemed to be without merit, and therefore, the 
relief Petitioner seeks on those claims is denied with prejudice. 
5. All other claims not specifically addressed herein are also deemed to be without merit 
and are also denied with prejudice. R. 184. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant should not have to serve the sentence for the tampering with evidence charge 
because that charge was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant did not waive 
the right to assert the bar because the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional issue which can not 
be waived even by entering a guilty plea. The only way Appellant could waive the bar is if he did 
so knowingly and voluntarily, which is not the case here because he was not informed by his 
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attorney or the court of the applicable statute of limitations and that he would be waiving it by 
entering the guilty plea. 
Appellant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because 
his appointed attorney did not advise him of the statute of limitations issue on the tampering 
charge. This lack of correct advice by counsel falls below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and the result in the prior proceedings would have been different had 
Appellant been correctly advised as he was with the proposed perjury charge. Also, there were 
insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which Judge Brian could base his final 
Order upon on this issue. 
Appellant should not have to pay the $160,000.00 in restitution because it was intended 
to be costs instead of restitution, and because section 77-32a-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended), provides that costs cannot include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally 
guaranteed trial, and the cost of court-appointed counsel for an indigent defendant is certainly an 
expense inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial. Also, there were insufficient 
findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which Judge Brian could base his final Order on in 




APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO ASSERT THE BAR OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE TO SERVE THE 
SENTENCE FOR THE TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE CHARGE 
It is clearly set forth in section 76-1-302 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), that: 
Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for: 
(a) a felony . . . shall be commenced within four years after it is committed. 
There is no question in this case that when Appellant entered his plea of guilty to the 
amended charge of tampering with evidence it was well beyond the four-year statute of limitation. 
The question is whether Appellant waived the right to assert the bar at this time by entering the 
guilty plea earlier. As counsel for Appellee correctly stated at the hearing, the question to be 
answered in determining whether the right was waived is whether the statute of limitations is a 
jurisdictional issue. However, counsel for Appellee was wrong in its assessment that the issue is 
nonjurisdictional. 
Before going any further on this issue, it should be noted that in Utah it is the State's 
burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by the statute of limitations. See, State v„ 
Pierce. 782 P.2d 194 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Without waiving the right to have the State shoulder 
its burden, Appellant wishes to offer his own proof that the criminal action for tampering with 
evidence is barred. 
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At the hearing on Appellant's Petition, counsel for Appellee made reference to the 
"Parsons" case as holding that the statute of limitations is a nonjurisdictional issue. This 
representation was incorrect. What Parsons did hold was that: 
The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings. . . is that by pleading guilty, the 
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and 
thereby waives all noqjurisdictional defects including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations. 
See, State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d.. 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989)(emphasis added). See also. State v. 
Sery. 758 P.2d. 935 (Utah App. 1988), wherein this Court held that "...the common law rule [is] 
that a voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues...." State 
v. Serv. 758 P.2d. at 938. 
In Parsons and in Sery the issue of whether the statute of limitations was jurisdictional or 
not was not addressed. In fact, according to research done by this counsel, this issue has not ever 
been specifically addressed in Utah and appears to be one of first impression. However, the 
closest statement that could be found is in the case of State v. Pierce. 782 P.2d. 194 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). In Pierce this Court was determining the issue of who carried the burden of proving 
that the statute of limitations was not a bar to prosecution. In holding that the State has the 
burden, this court stated: 
Similarly, in Parnell v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.App. 3d 392, 173 Cal. Rptr. 906, 914 
(1981), the court held that 'because the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, the People 
have the burden of supporting an information with some evidence that the prosecution is 
not barred by limitations. 
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&. At 196. (Emphasis added) Of significance is what this Court stated next: 
We agree with the rationale of those cases, and, therefore, fmd that the State bears the 
burden of proving that a criminal action is not barred by the statute of limitations.... 
M- In other words, this Court agreed with the rationale that the statute of limitations is 
jurisdictional. Consequently, Appellant could not waive the statute of limitations as a bar to the 
charge of tampering with evidence. 
Going outside of Utah jurisprudence, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the 
statute of limitations is jurisdictional. In United States v. Cooper. 956 F.2d. 960 (10th Cir. 
1992), the court held that: 
We must, therefore, conclude that the law of this circuit is that if the statute of limitations 
is to have any meaning in the administration of criminal justice, it must be held to operate 
as a jurisdictional limitation upon the power to prosecute and punish. The language of the 
statute clearly provides that no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for the 
offense charged here, unless the information is instituted within five years after the 
commission of the offense. It is plainly a limitation upon the power to prosecute or 
punish. It is, therefore, jurisdictional and noticeable at this appellate state of the 
proceedings. 
United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d. at 961, 962 (emphasis added). 
Other states have held that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional, and thus, not 
waivable. See, for example, Hunt v. State. 642 So.2d. 999 (Ala. App. 1993); Cane v, State, 560 
A.2d. 1063 (Del. Supp. 1989); State v, Milter, 525 NW2d. 576 (Minn. App. 1994); State v, 
Fischer. 699 P.2d. 249 (Wash. App. 1985); State vr Barber, 653 P.2d. 29 (Ariz. App. 1982); and, 
People v. Zamora. 557 P.2d. 75 (Cal. 1976). 
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Some states have held that the statute of limitations can be waived if it is done knowingly 
and voluntarily. See, "Waiver of Bar of Limitations Against Criminal Prosecution" 78 A.L.R. 
4th 693, and cases cited therein. If it is held that this rule is applicable in Utah, it certainly didn't 
happen in this case. At no time was Appellant informed by his appointed counsel that Appellant 
would be waiving the statute of limitations by pleading guilty to the tampering charge, and at no 
time did the court notify Appellant of this when the plea was entered. In making his conclusions 
of law Judge Brian stated that he believed the plea was knowing and voluntary, and this belief was 
based upon his recollection of the entry of the plea. It certainly was not based on any testimony 
at the hearing because the only testimony at the hearing was that of Appellant's to the effect that 
he was not informed of the statute of limitations issue in relation to the tampering charge. Put 
another way, you can not give something up that you do not know you have. Appellant did not 
know he had the right to raise the statute of limitations issue so how could he waive it. There was 
no knowing and voluntary waiver. 
POINT n 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE QF COUNSEL 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution, guarantee criminal defendants the assistance of counsel. This right is denied 
if counsel is ineffective in his assistance. 
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The Utah Supreme court has held that: 
to assert successfully an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that 
(1) counsel's performance was deficient in some demonstrable manner so as to fall below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) there is a reasonable 
probability that but for the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding would have 
been more favorable to the defendant. 
See, State v. Butterfield. 784 P.2d. 153 (Utah 1989). This standard is essentially consistent with 
the standard forth in the United States Supreme Court case of Strikland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 
668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
The performance of Appellant's former counsel was deficient in that he did not inform 
Appellant of the statute of limitations issue in regards to the tampering charge. The statute of 
limitations is a basic defense to any attorney in the civil and criminal arena. It certainly would be 
reasonable to expect that any competent counsel would make a motion to raise the bar when 
applicable. Indeed, in this case prior counsel did raise the issue in regards to the proposed perjury 
charge. If appointed counsel knew about the statute of limitations on the perjury charge it would 
be more than reasonable to assume that he would know about the statute of limitations on the 
tampering since they are both the same. 
There is no question that if Appellant would have been informed of the statute of 
limitations bar, the result would have been different and more favorable to Appellant. In 
particular, Appellant would have not had another second degree felony, and would not be facing 
consecutive 1-15 terms in prison. Nothing could be more prejudicial than this. 
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As noted earlier, Judge Brian's findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue are 
deficient. In his findings of fact all he states is that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
was raised, but he makes no specific findings in regards to that issue. In his conclusions of law 
Judge Brian did not make any reference to this issue. At the minimum this case should be 
remanded for specific findings and conclusions on this issue. 
POINT HI 
APPELLANT WAS WRONGFULLY ASSESSED $160.000.00 IN RESTITUTION 
When Appellant was sentenced on the current charges he was sentenced to pay "restitution 
in the amount of $160,000 to Cache County plus the expenses of burial of the victim paid to the 
natural mother." R. 6. The expenses for the burial amounted to about $700.00. The Judgment 
and Sentence did not articulate specifically what the basis for the other $160,000.00 was, but it 
can be safely assumed that since it was awarded to Cache County it was to serve as a recoupment 
for expenses associated with the prosecution of Appellant. 
Appellant raised this issue in his Petition for Extraordinary Relief (see R. 27), and at the 
hearing (see R. 226). However, once again, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
deficient of any mention of this issue. At a minimum, this case should be remanded for specific 
findings on this issue. In spite of these deficiencies, Appellant would like to set forth his argument 
as best he can on this issue. 
It is presumed that when the sentencing court ordered "restitution" it really meant "costs." 
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Section 76-3-201(d) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), defines restitution as "...payment for 
pecuniary damages to a victim...." Subsection (c) defines "pecuniary damages" as "...all special 
damages...which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts...." And subsection (e) defines "victim" as "...any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages...." Read together it is clear that restitution is something that is 
ordered on behalf of individual persons, and not governmental agencies such as Cache County. 
Furthermore, the restitution to the individual victim, the mother of the child, amounted to 
about $700.00. It is obvious the only basis for the award to Cache County was to recoup costs 
for prosecution of the matter. 
The Utah Code section applicable to recoupment of costs is section 77-32a-l et seq. (1953 
as amended). Section two of this chapter provides in relevant part: 
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the state or any political 
subdivision in investigating, searching for, apprehending, and prosecuting the defendant, 
including attorneys fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant.... Cost cannot 
include expenses inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures 
in connection with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that must be 
made by the public irrespective of specific violations of the law. Costs cannot include 
attorneys fees for prosecuting attorneys. 
This section it seems to contradict itself. In one part it provides that expenses for appointed 
counsel can be assessed as costs, but then it provides that costs cannot include expenses inherent 
in providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial. It is respectfully submitted that the cost of 
appointed counsel is an expense inherent in providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial. A 
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constitutional trial is one in which all constitutional guarantees are provided for. As stated 
earlier, one of those guarantees is the right to have the assistance of counsel at trial as set forth in 
the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. This right to assistance of counsel is so 
fundamental to a fair trial that if a person can not afford an attorney, the state will provide one at 
public expense. In State v. Vincent. 845 P.2d. 254 (Utah App. 1992), this Court held that "every 
person charged with an offense which may be punished by imprisonment is entitled to the 
assistance of counsel." State v. Vincent. 845 P.2d. at 256. This Court went on to state that "An 
indigent person charged with such a criminal offense has a right to appointed counsel at public 
expense." Id. This Court then cited in support of this proposition the famous United States 
Supreme Court case of Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335, 342-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 795-97 
(1963). 
In resolving the apparent conflict or vagueness of section 77-32a-2, it is respectfully 
submitted that the fundamental interest of assuring a fair trial by appointing counsel to indigent 
defendants far outweighs any interest the State may have in recouping expenses for that appointed 
counsel. 
In addition, if the recoupment in this case is deemed constitutional, then the $160,000.00 
in costs seems excessive, and would seem to defeat the rehabilitative goal of parole. Section 77-
32a-3 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), provides the factors the court should consider in 
assessing costs. It provides: 
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The court shall not include in the judgment a sentence that a defendant pay costs unless the 
defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment 
of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the defendant and the 
nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose and that restitution by the first 
priority. 
Obviously, it would be enlightening if we had some specific findings of fact to apply to these 
rules, but we don't, and so we have to make the argument the best we can. Appellant was indigent 
before he was arrested, and will likely be indigent when he is released on parole. Appellant does 
not have any significant financial resources that he could apply to an onerous burden. It would 
probably take him the rest of his life, if that is possible, to pay the amount assessed. 
CONCLUSION 
The dismissal of Appellant's Petition for Extraordinary Relief should be vacated, and 
Appellant's request that his sentence on the count of tampering with evidence should be vacated 
should be granted. Also, due to the ineffectiveness of previous counsel, the entire plea bargain, 
and thus, the entire sentence previously entered should be vacated, and Appellant should have the 
opportunity of either negotiating a new plea bargain or going to trial. In addition, the assessment 
of $160,000.00 should be vacated because it is for costs inherent in providing a constitutionally 
guaranteed trial. If this award of costs is not totally vacated, it should be substantially reduced 
to be consistent with Appellant's ability to pay. In regards to these last two issues, at a minimum, 
the case should be remanded for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
18 
Respectfully submitted this 21 day of July, 1997 
^ - r - . / 
Mark T. Ethington 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I am employed by the office of Day Shell & Liljenquist, L.C., and that 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following by first class mail, postage pre-
paid, on this 21 day of July, 1997: 
Christine Soltis 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
19 
ADDENDUM 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL ORDER 
20 
/'?.'/ --
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for the Utah Board of Pardons 
160 East 300 South - Sixth Floor 
PO Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, : 
PETITIONER, 
STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH 
STATE BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE, 
RESPONDENTS. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
: AND FINAL ORDER 
: Case No. 960903535 HC 
: Judge Pat B. Brian 
This matter came before the Court on September 3, 1996 at 
2:00 p.m., to consider Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief and Respondents1 motions to dismiss for payment of filing 
fee and for failure to comply with the applicable statute of 
limitations. Petitioner was present and represented pro ££. The 
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole was represented by Assistant 
Attorney General Lorenzo K. Miller, and the State of Utah was 
represented by Assistant Attorney General David E. Yocom. 
The Court, having thoroughly read all memoranda, documents, 
and pleadings, having reviewed the law applicable to this case, 
having heard oral argument from the parties, and being familiar 
FILED DISTRICT ccurrr 
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OCT 2 5 1996 
with Petitioner's criminal proceedings, issued its decisions and 
j udgment. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now makes the following 
findings and conclusions. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Petitioner Steven Ray James, inmate no. 19435, is 
lawfully incarcerated at the Uc'ah State Prison under a valid 
judgment and commitment order issued by this court. 
2. Petitioner was arrested on October 23, 1986, and after a 
jury trial he was convicted of Criminal Homicide, a capital 
offense, and sentenced to serve life in prison. 
3. The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed Petitioner's 
conviction and remanded the case back to this court for further 
proceedings. 
4. Subsequently, through a plea bargain agreement, 
Petitioner pled guilty to Manslaughter, a second degree felony, and 
Tampering with Evidence, also a second degree felony. In return 
for his plea, the State dismissed the capital offense. 
5. After a lengthy colloquy with the Petitioner, and 
determining that his plea was knowing and voluntary, the Court 
accepted Petitioner's plea and set the case for sentencing. 
6. On September 8, 1993, this Court sentenced Petitioner to 
serve two indeterminate terms of imprisonment at the Utah State 
2 
Prison, and -it ordered that both sentences to run consecutively to 
each other. 
7. From his arrest on October 23, 1986, until his second 
commitment on September 8, 1993, Petitioner remained in state 
custody and was not released from incarceration. 
8. On February 11, 1994, Petitioner appeared before the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole for an original parole-grant hearing. 
9. At that time, the Board calculated Petitioner's 
expiration dates as being October 22, 2001 (for the manslaughter 
conviction), and October 21, 2016 (for the tampering conviction). 
10. These calculations were based upon the information that 
Petitioner served approximately 2512 days prior to his September 8, 
1993 commitment (e.g., from October 23, 1986 to September 8, 1993). 
11. At the conclusion of the parole hearing, the hearing 
officer took Petitioner's case under advisement and issued 
Petitioner an interim disposition form indicating the above-
mentioned expiration dates. 
12. On February 24, 1994. the full Board made its decision 
and issued a second disposition form. 
13. This form incorrectly stated that Petitioner's expiration 
dates were September 7, 2008, and September 6, 2023, which would be 
the correct dates had Petitioner not been given credit for time 
served prior to the September 8, 1993 commitment date. 
3 
14. Petitioner never notified the Board of the 
miscalculations, but instead filed the instant action against the 
Board claiming that his rights had been violated because the Board 
was refusing to grant credit for time served as ordered by this 
court. 
15. Subsequently, the Board reviewed Petitioner's claims and 
determined that the disposition form, dated February 24, 1994, was 
incorrect, and it corrected the clerical errors and issued a new 
disposition form reflecting the corrections. 
16. The amended disposition form indicates that Petitioner's 
sentences will expire on October 21, 2001, for the manslaughter 
conviction, and on October 20, 2016, for the tampering conviction, 
which is exactly 3 0 years (minus three days) from the date 
Petitioner was first arrested and placed in state custody for the 
charged offenses. 
17. On September 3, 1996, Petitioner paid the $120.00 filing 
fee required under section 21-1-5(1)(a) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
18. In addition to the claims against the Beard, Petitioner 
also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he 
allowed petitioner to plea to the tampering charge when the statute 
of limitations for that crime had allegedly run. 
19. Petitioner asserts that he should not be forced to serve 
the 1-15 year consecutive sentence for the tampering conviction 
because he could not have been tried on that offense had he not 
pled guilty. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The first issue that must be resolved in this case is the 
proper filing fee. The Court has reviewed Petitioner's prison 
financial statement, and based upon that record and Petitioner's 
in court statements, the Court determines that Petitioner has had 
and continues to have sufficient funds to pay a full filing fee. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner should pay the 
statutory filing fee of $120.00 before proceeding with this 
action. However, in the interest of justice, the Court will 
grant Petitioner until September 10, 1996 to pay the required 
fee. Payment in full by that date will be deemed timely by the 
Court. 
The second issue that must be resolved is Petitioner's 
claims that the Board failed to grant him credit for time served 
prior to his second conviction. The record clearly indicates 
that since Petitioner pointed out the error to the Board, the 
Board reviewed its disposition and amended its Order to reflect 
the proper expiration dates. 
Because the Board has corrected its mistake in this matter 
and has issued a corrected disposition form containing the 
appropriate expiration dates, the parties are correct in 
asserting that this issue is moot and there is nothing left for 
the court to remedy on these claims. Therefore, these claims 
have been resolved and should be dismissed. 
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As to Petitioner's'post-conviction claims, it appears that 
these claims were raised for the first time approximately 15 days 
after the statute of limitations ran. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-107. From the record, it also appears that Petitioner was 
incarcerated at the prison during the entire one-year period, and 
therefore, the Court believes that Petitioner was unaware of the 
limitation period imposed by the new Section 78-35a-107, having 
neither constructive notice nor actual notice of the recent 
legislation. Furthermore, the Court does not believe that a 15-
day delay in bringing this type of action was unreasonable under 
the circumstances of Petitioner's case. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the "interest of 
justice" provisions of section 78-35a-107 (3), this case should 
not be time barred. 
Having determined that the statute of limitations found in 
section 78-35a-107 does not bar the post-conviction claims, the 
Court nevertheless concludes that Petitioner's claims should be 
dismissed. Here Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered 
into an agreement with the State to plead guilty to one count of 
Manslaughter and one count of Tampering with a Witness, and in 
exchange for that plea, the State dismissed the capital charge 
against him. As a result of the plea agreement, Petitioner was 
sentenced to serve two consecutive 15-year terms rather than a 
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possible life sentence had he been convicted of the capital 
offense. 
In making the plea agreement, Petitioner waived any defenses 
he may have had to the crimes to which be pled and he accepted 
the judgment of guilty for those offenses. Accordingly, the 
Court concludes that Petitioner's plea of guilty to the tampering 
charge waived any right Petitioner may have had to attack the 
conviction, and he is therefore collaterally barred from seeking 
habeas corpus relief at this time. 
Finally, Petitioner claims that the Court failed to order 
the statutory 85% surcharge when imposing the fine in his case, 
and therefore, the State is barred from collecting that fee. The 
Court concludes that Petitioner's position may have some merit; 
and, therefore, the Court believes that the fee should not be 
collected unless the Board of Pardons orders otherwise. In that 
event, the Board should file an objection with this Court. 
Based on the foregoing, the court now makes the following 
order: 
FINAfr QEPER 
1. The statutory surcharges that should have been assessed 
to each of Petitioner's two $10,000.00 fines, shall not be 
collected. However, if the Utah Board of Pardons objects to this 
order, the Board should file an objection with this Court, and 
the matter will come back before the Court for final resolution. 
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2. The relief Petitioner seeks regarding credit for time 
served has already been granted, making this issue moot, and 
therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks is denied with prejudice. 
3. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss based upon the statute 
of limitations contained in Section 78-35-107 is denied for the 
reasons stated above. 
4. Petitioner's Post-Conviction claims are deemed to be 
without merit, and therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks on 
those claims is denied with prejudice. 
5. All other claims not specifically addressed herein are 
also deemed to be without merit and are also denied with 
prejudice. 
6. All issues resolved, this case is hereljgy dismissed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this Jj^ day of SQ^feSSber, 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN" 
Third Judicial District Ji4.dge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
STEVEN RAY JAMES 
Attorney Pro ££ 
A^%> 
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